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The nascent debate on Australian federalism has hitherto focused almost entirely 
on Commonwealth-state interrelationships to the virtual exclusion of local 
government. Since Australian local government employs around 156,000 people 
and spends in excess of $10 billion this neglect is unfortunate. In an effort to at 
least partly remedy this oversight, the present paper seeks to assess various 
unsettled questions in local government financial relationships with both 
Commonwealth and state governments, especially the issue of financial assistance 
grants and their efficiency consequences. 
 
It is now widely accepted that good governance of an advanced modern economy will 
typically involve some combination of local and central government decision-making, 
especially in countries which cover vast geographic areas, like Australia, Canada and the 
United States. Nevertheless, considerable current interest has once again been directed at 
precisely how various public responsibilities should be allocated between the different tiers of 
government in a federation. In the United States, federalism is firmly back on the public 
agenda (Donahue 1997). For instance, Inman and Rubinfeld (1997) have recently proposed 
three alternative models to inform this debate, namely ‘economic federalism’, ‘cooperative 
federalism’, and ‘democratic federalism’. 
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A similar embryonic debate is beginning to take shape in Australia (Galligan 1995). However, 
almost all the extant discussion has focussed entirely on federal/state relationships to the 
virtual exclusion of local government (Sharman 1998). The present paper seeks to at least 
partly remedy this neglect in Inman and Rubinfeld’s (1997) ‘economic federalism’ sphere by 
reviewing local government financial relationships in Australia and exploring various 
unresolved questions in this area. 
The paper itself is divided into four main parts. The first section examines the sources and 
composition of Australian local government finance. The second section investigates the 
nature of financial assistance grants. The controversial question of the efficiency 
consequences of grant distribution is addressed in the third section. The paper ends with some 
brief concluding remarks. 
Sources and composition 
Local governments in Australia finance their activities from a variety of sources. The main 
sources are: (i) taxes on property (or municipal rates), (ii) fees and fines (referring to user 
charges imposed for services rendered and fines associated with regulatory functions), (iii) net 
operating surplus of public trading enterprises (normally utilities), (iv) grants from the 
Commonwealth or respective state government, and (v) interest received from council 
investments.  
Table 1: Taxation by Level of Government 
Level 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Commonwealth 93413 (78.5) 
87530 
(76.1) 
88830 
(75.4) 
93328 
(74.5) 
105092 
(75.9) 
115486 
(76.3) 
State/Territory 21121 (17.7) 
22572 
(19.8) 
24093 
(20.4) 
26787 
(21.4) 
28144 
(20.3) 
30360 
(20.1) 
Local 4480     (3.8) 
4703     
(4.1) 
4968     
(4.2) 
5145     
(4.1) 
5265     
(3.8) 
5428     
(3.6) 
Source: ABS 5506.0 Taxation Revenue, Australia.  
Notes: Totals exclude direct taxes paid by State and Territory government public trading enterprises to the 
Commonwealth government; taxes are in $ millions, figures in brackets are the corresponding percentage of total 
taxation. 
Taxation by level of government in Australia is outlined in Table 1. In terms of overall public 
sector revenue-raising capacity in Australia, the Commonwealth raises approximately 75 
percent, the states around 21 percent, and local government about 4 percent. Accordingly, in 
the Australian federal system, own-source revenues as a percentage of own-purpose outlays 
(an indicator of vertical fiscal imbalance) are 142 percent for the Commonwealth, 50 percent 
for the states, and 80 percent for local government. 
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As itemised in Table 2, the main sources of revenue for Australian local governments are 
taxes, fees and fines (46.5%), followed by intergovernmental grants (17.4%) and sale of 
goods and services (22.9%). A more accurate and comprehensive breakdown of revenue by 
specific source is unfortunately not available. However, estimates indicate that municipal 
rates comprise some 90 percent of taxes, fees and charges, with the remainder being mainly 
garbage fees. Of the grants received, approximately 70 percent are financial assistance grants 
and specific purpose payments made by the Commonwealth, of which the larger portion are 
general purpose grants (some 57 percent) and identified local roads grants a further 25 
percent.  
Table 2: Local Government Revenue Sources, 1995/96 
Revenue source NSW Vic. Qld. SA WA Tas. NT Total 
Taxes, fees and fines 1979 
(49.2) 
1287 
(48.9) 
1109 
(37.6) 
461 
(58.3) 
512 
(46.0) 
142 
(46.3) 
31   
(43.1) 
5522 
(46.5) 
Public trading operating surplus 80   
(2.0) 
0   
(0.0) 
417 
(14.1) 
1   
(0.1) 
0   
(0.0) 
26   
(8.5) 
0   
(0.0) 
523   
(4.4) 
Interest received 175 
(4.3) 
74   
(2.8) 
51  
(1.7) 
43   
(5.4) 
43   
(3.9) 
12   
(3.9) 
1   
(1.4) 
399   
(3.4) 
Grants received 642 
(15.6) 
589 
(22.4) 
388 
(13.2) 
126 
(15.9) 
238 
(21.4) 
67   
(21.8) 
24   
(33.3) 
2074 
(17.4) 
Sales of goods and services 807   
(20.0) 
680 
(25.8) 
788 
(26.7) 
125 
(15.8) 
257 
(23.1) 
47   
(15.3) 
16   
(22.2) 
2720 
(22.9) 
Other revenue 343 
(8.5) 
2 
(0.1) 
194   
(6.6) 
34   
(4.3) 
62   
(5.6) 
13   
(4.2) 
0   
(0.0) 
649   
(5.5) 
Total 4026 
(100.0) 
2633 
(100.0) 
2947 
(100.0) 
791  
(100.0) 
1112 
(100.0) 
307  
(100.0) 
72   
(100.0) 
11888 
(100.0) 
Source: ABS 5512.0 Government Finance Statistics, Australia.  
Notes: Revenues are in $ millions, figures in brackets are the corresponding percentage of total revenues. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable variation in the composition of local government revenue 
across the states and over time (AURDR 1994a). For example, the proportion of revenue 
derived from grants ranges from 33 percent in the Northern Territory to just over 13 percent 
in Queensland, whilst taxes, fees and fines make up 58 percent of local government revenue 
in South Australia and just 38 percent in Queensland. The AURDR (1997a: 77) concluded 
that “if the data on rating support can be seen as a guide to the degree of fiscal imbalance, 
then it would appear that Queensland and Western Australia have the greatest disparity within 
their respective states, and Victoria and South Australia the least”. 
In terms of international comparisons, several points can be raised. In the case of the United 
States, the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance is reasonably similar to that in Australia, with 
local government raising about 70 to 80 percent of its own requirements. However, the source 
of the imbalance is quite different, with the larger portion of funding assistance being made 
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by state rather than federal government. By contrast, in Australia the balance is provided 
almost exclusively by the federal government. As indicated in Table 3, the Commonwealth 
grant for 1997/98 is estimated to be some $1.2 billion; $0.372 billion for the purposes of local 
roads, and $0.840 billion in financial assistance grants. In the U.S., only about 17 percent of 
grants to local government are ‘block’ or general purpose grants, with the remainder being 
‘categorical’ or specific purpose grants. In addition, extensive use is made in the U.S. of 
federal ‘mandates’ which dictate the actions of local governments but provide no finance 
(AURDR 1994a: 17). However, the main difference between Australia and the United States 
lies in is the broader range of revenue-raising instruments available to local government in the 
latter country. These include personal income taxes (providing approximately 5 percent of 
own-source revenue), corporate income taxes (1 percent), property taxes (74 percent) and 
taxes on consumption (20 percent). 
Table 3: National Grant Allocation, 1991/92 to 1997/98 
 General purpose Local Roads Total 
1991/92 714.969 303.174 1018.143 
1992/93 730.122 318.971 1049.093 
1993/94 737.203 322.065 1059.268 
1994/95 756.446 330.471 1086.917 
1995/96 806.748 357.977 1164.725 
1996/97 833.693 369.034 1202.727 
1997/98 840.112 372.782 1212.894 
Source: National Office of Local Government (1997) 1996/97 Report on the 
Operation of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995.  
Notes: Grants to the Australian Capital Territory under the Act commenced in 
1995/96; the 1997/98 grant allocation is the estimated entitlement; figures are in 
$ millions. 
A similar situation holds in other federal OECD countries. For example, in Austria local 
government raises 34.7 percent of own-source revenue through personal income taxes, 5.5 
percent from corporate income taxes, 11.0 percent from payroll taxation, 5.4 percent from 
property taxes, and 34.5 percent from consumption and other taxes. In Germany and 
Switzerland, personal income taxes are the primary own-source revenue, providing 66.5 and 
76.5 percent of own-source revenues respectively. However, in Canada local governments are 
equally dependent upon property taxes (80 percent), despite having recourse to residual, 
mainly business, taxes (18 percent). 
In terms of Australian local government own-source revenue, several salient features can be 
identified. First, when combined together the sources of revenue which can be assessed by 
local councils (including the use of loan funds) represent at least 80 percent of ordinary 
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services revenues for most Australian local governments. Nevertheless, rates on property 
remain the dominant own-source revenue component of local government in Australia, 
providing some 40 to 50 percent of total ordinary services revenue (MCS 1996: 4). Second, 
despite having recourse to only a relatively small number of revenue sources, local 
government in Australia is only responsible for a relatively narrow range of property-related 
functions. However, recent legislative reforms indicate that the emphasis in Australian local 
government is increasingly being shifted towards ‘service-related’ functions and this is likely 
to see an increase in the use of ‘user-pay’ charges (MCS 1996; McNeill 1997). Finally, quite 
apart from theoretical issues surrounding the use of property rates as a means of finance, the 
rate-based revenue-raising capacity of Australia local governments is subject to considerable 
distortion. Many of these issues involve artificial restrictions on revenue raising, such as rate 
capping and the overall rating methodology set down in the various states. However, 
controversy also surrounds the manner in which the various granting bodies distribute funds 
in light of revenue-raising capacity, and this issue will be developed further below. 
Table 4: Financial Assistance Grants as a Percentage of Rate Revenue by ACLG Category 
 NSW Vic. Qld. SA WA Tas. 
UCC 0.31 1.72 11.59 3.55 4.17 6.23 
UDV/UDL 11.16 12.35 17.95 16.77 11.32 22.41 
UDM 6.99 10.34   15.57 11.17 21.31 
UDS  1.92  11.88 10.11  
URV/URL 18.6 15.09 14.36 23.37 14.10  
URM 19.16 21.53  19.01 21.58 33.81 
URS 24.48 22.84 15.93   17.22 
UFL 33.32 28.86 24.17 32.47 37.64 17.61 
UFM/UFS 57.35 37.79 36.83 35.77 75.12 51.93 
RAV/RAL 64.68 37.22 39.03 26.99 60.37 40.33 
RAM 90.94 48.43 77.68 45.48 82.39 64.41 
RAS 91.45 50.79 143.79 58.10 82.90 106.76 
RTL     41.80  
RTM/RTS/RTX   215.78 17.82 134.65  
Overall 23.26 18.32 25.57 21.65 29.79 28.11 
Source: Australian Urban and Regional Development Review (1994a) Financing Local 
Government: A Review of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act.  
Codes: (first two letters) UD – urban developed; UF – urban fringe; UR – urban 
regional; RA – rural agricultural; RT – rural remote; (third letter) C – capital city; V – 
very large; L – large; M – medium; S – small; X – extra small. 
Several interesting points also arise concerning the composition of intergovernmental grants in local 
government finance. Firstly, as detailed in Table 4, the contribution of grants to total revenue 
sources varies not only across states (as detailed in Table 2), but also across local government 
classifications within states. The contribution of (Commonwealth provided) financial assistance 
grants to, say, large urban fringe areas, varies from under 18 percent of own-source rate revenue in 
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Tasmania to more than 37 percent in Western Australia. Similarly, grants as a proportion of rate 
revenue within states vary significantly. For example, in NSW grants to Sydney (as the capital city) 
sum to less than 1 percent of rate revenue, but increase to more than 90 percent for small rural urban 
areas. This will be developed at length in the next section. 
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Table 5: Specific Purpose Payments to Local Government, 1996/97 
Title NSW Vic. Qld. SA WA Tas. NT Total 
Current payments   
Home and community care 979 1093 92 148 406 113 – 2832
Aged/disabled homes and hostels 6415 12236 3239 2382 4367 437 45 29121
Disability services 851 495 434 – – – 17 1796
Children’s services 58660 75436 15206 1288 12394 7899 1894 172777
Indigenous employment strategies 38 98 822 79 – – 19 1057
LGDP 892 274 141 283 200 116 524 2440
Other current – – – – 20 – – –
Total current 67836 89632 19934 4101 17467 8565 2499 210033
Capital payments   
Aged/disabled homes and hostels 565 3908 188 37 225 168 – 5090
Disability services 12 11 – – – – – 23
Children’s services 328 216 69 5 63 332 156 1169
Total capital 905 4135 256 43 288 500 156 6282
Total payments 98740 93767 20191 4143 17755 9064 2654 216315
         
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (1997) Final Budget Outcome, 1996/97. 
Secondly, despite the common description of Australian local government as a state 
responsibility, the vast majority of grants derive from the Commonwealth. In 1996/97 the 
Commonwealth provided general purpose and local roads grant allocations of $833.7 and 
$369.9 millions respectively. Moreover, since Commonwealth funding for local government 
commenced in 1974/75, the Commonwealth has provided over 80 percent of total local 
government grant income through the provision of financial assistance grants. In 1995/96 the 
Commonwealth provided over 97.4 percent of government assistance to local government in 
Australia. Furthermore, the contribution of state governments to sub-jurisdictional local 
governments has steadily declined over time.  
Finally, in addition to financial assistance grants, the Commonwealth has also been a 
significant provider of funding for other services such as childcare, aged, employment and 
other community welfare programs. Details are provided in Table 5 for fiscal year 1996/97. 
These specific purpose payments or SPPs totalled $216.3 million in 1996/97 or more than 20 
percent of total Commonwealth grants to local government (excluding the roads component). 
The magnitude and composition of these payments directly reflects the modifications in 
Commonwealth/local relations. 
Financial assistance grants 
Under the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (§81), the Commonwealth is 
given powers to grant financial assistance to any state for any purpose on such terms and 
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conditions as Parliament thinks fit. Nevertheless, Commonwealth assistance to local 
government did not effectively commence until 1974/75 when untied grants were distributed 
on the basis of recommendations made by the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), 
operating under the Grants Commission Act (1973). This was the first instance when the CGC 
was required to review local government finances. Before this, its main role (and that pursued 
since) had been the allocation between states of Commonwealth general purpose grants. 
However, despite the allocation of local government assistance being subsequently taken up 
by separate state Grants Commissions, the basic principles and procedures of fund 
distribution were established at this time. These included the allocation of funds on a 
‘horizontal equalisation’ basis and the assessment of councils’ ability to raise revenue solely 
on the basis of rateable property values. 
In 1976 the Local Government (Personal Income Tax Sharing) Act was passed. This provided 
for payments to the states of a specified percentage of Commonwealth personal income tax 
revenue to be distributed in turn to local government. The inter-state distribution principles 
were to allocate 30 percent to councils on a per capita basis, with the remainder made on a 
horizontal equalisation basis. Subsequently, these and other principles were enshrined in the 
Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1986 following recommendations made by the 
1985 National Inquiry into Local Government Finance. The main features of this Act were: 
(i) distribution of grants among states (including the Northern Territory) on a per capita basis; 
(ii) distribution within states (referred to as Financial Assistance Grants or FAGs) to be 
determined by State Local Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs) on the basis of 
horizontal equalisation; (iii) a minimum grants entitlement for each councils based on 
population; and (iv) provision for informal local government bodies, such as Aboriginal 
communities in remote areas, to receive grants. The main effects of this Act were effectively 
to sever the link between Commonwealth personal income tax revenues and total payments to 
local government, and to establish the 30 percent per capita grant allocation as a ‘safety net’ 
for council revenues. 
Additional reports into local government finance and the methodologies used by the state 
LGGCs to distribute FAGs followed in 1994; namely, Financing Local Government: A 
Review of the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1986 and Local Government 
Funding Methodologies. The main finding of these reports was “that the seven different 
models operating were of little relevance in ensuring equity in grant distribution or allowing 
for the monitoring of outcomes” (NOLG 1997: 59). Accordingly, the revised Local 
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Government (Financial Assistance) Act 1995 made a number of changes. These included: (i) 
recognition of the importance of improving efficiency and effectiveness in councils; (ii) 
recognition of the importance of improving local government services to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander communities; (iii) provision of a report to Parliament on the operation 
of the Act and performance of councils; (iv) provision of National Principles to provide 
additional criteria for the allocation of funds among councils; (v) inclusion of grants to the 
Australian Capital Territory for local government purposes.  
Closely associated with the framing of the new Act, followed an agreement by 
Commonwealth, State/Territory ministers and the Australian Local Government Association 
to a set of principles for allocating general purpose and local road grants. In part, these 
National Principles were intended to reflect existing and well-established distribution 
practices that were employed not only by most state and territory LGGCs, but also those of 
the CGC. Of the five principles embodied in Part A of the National Principles (general 
purpose grants), the first three (horizontal equalisation, effort neutrality and minimum grants) 
reiterated principles that existed in the current legislation. Additional principles related to the 
recognition of additional revenue used to meet expenditure needs being included in 
assessment calculations, and the needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. Part B of the 
National Principles (roads component) stipulated that the identified roads component of FAGs 
should be made as far as practicable on the basis of the relative needs of each council. 
Relevant consideration for the purpose of this principle included the length, type and usage of 
roads in each local governing area.  
Methods used by Local Government Grants Commissions 
Despite the fact that the Commonwealth government provides the funding, the actual 
allocation and distribution of monies to local governments is made through state-based Local 
Government Grants Commissions (LGGCs). The principles applied by these LGGCs to grant 
allocation are largely based upon a common legislative core: (i) allocation of funds on a full 
horizontal equalisation basis; (ii) the functioning of each local government at a standard not 
lower than the average standard of other local governing bodies in the state; (iii) the 
assessment of revenue and expenditure needs and disabilities; and (iv) effort neutrality. The 
most important consideration here is that the allocation of grants is based on the LGGCs 
objective assessment of local government needs and disabilities: both expenditure – the 
differential costs, relative to standard, that a council needs to provide a standard level of 
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services – and revenue – the differential revenues a council would raise if the standardised 
revenue effort was applied to its revenue base. In the case of expenditure disabilities, factors 
usually taken into account include socioeconomic, demographic and geographic attributes, 
whilst revenue disabilities are largely proxied by variance in rateable property value. It is 
important to note that the horizontal equalisation principles under which these assessments are 
made generates “...equalisation of the capacity to provide services, but not the equalisation of 
outcomes” (AURDR, 1994a: 25). Furthermore, despite the fact that the various LGGCs derive 
their existence from a common Act and the state governments have agreed to a set of shared 
national principles, considerable differences in the state methodologies for funding assistance 
remain.  
Revenue capacity 
For most states, differences in the expenditure needs of councils and differences in revenue 
capacity for revenues other than rates affect grants much less than differences in rate revenue 
capacity (NOLG 1997: 98). However, considerable debate has arisen on the efficacy of the 
use of rateable property values alone as a means of assessing local government revenue 
raising capacity (as against some other multiple indicator) (NOLG 1997).  
Several different rating bases are employed in the states. Local governments in NSW, 
Queensland and the Northern Territory exclusively employ ‘unimproved’ property values, 
either ‘land’ or ‘site’ based [where land values are based on natural states, whilst site values 
are for cleared areas exclusive of buildings and other improvements]. In Victoria and South 
Australia, the basis of assessment is the improved (or capital) value of the property, whereas 
in Western Australia unimproved values are used for rural properties, and improved values 
are used for urban properties. In Tasmania, the basis of assessment is gross rental value or 
assessed annual value. Substantial differentials exist in the ability of local governments to 
generate revenue derive from these differences (MCS 1996: 15).  
The assessment of revenue capacity in each state, and consistency across state borders, will 
also depend on any additional provisions relating to revenue raising practice. The four main 
considerations are: (i) the use of minimum rates; (ii) pensioner remissions; (iii) differential 
rates; and (iv) rate capping (NOLG 1997: 100). First, the main difference between states in 
minimum rate provisions are whether limits are set on the proportion of total general rates to 
be raised from a flat charge per property. Second, across the states discounts for rate 
remissions also vary. Third, in all states and territories there is considerable discretion in the 
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use of differential rates for residential, commercial, industrial property, etc. Finally, rate 
capping or pegging may impact upon the revenue capacity of local governments across states.  
How much revenue assistance is given to local governments will also depend on the 
methodology employed by the relevant LGGC. Firstly, NSW, Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania all rely almost exclusively on the valuation tax base to calculate revenue capacity. 
How closely these methods approximate the underlying revenue raising capacity will 
generally depend on the property valuation technique employed. For example, it is assumed 
that incomes in the community are most closely approximated by rental value (as in 
Tasmania), followed by improved capital values (as in South Australia), followed  by 
unimproved values. Secondly, even though all LGGCs take account of SPPs (in line with the 
National Principles concerning other revenue sources) there is some variation in the way in 
which these SPPs are recognised. For instance, in Tasmania grants are averaged over 3 years, 
with only 80 percent being taken into account, while in NSW, Victoria and Western Australia, 
various discounting methods are applied.  
In general, the debate on assessing the revenue raising capacity in local government, and more 
importantly, the methods by which grants are allocated to attain horizontal equalisation on the 
revenue side, remains unresolved. On one hand, the Morton Report (1996) concluded that, 
other than the efficacy of different rating systems in proxying the true revenue raising 
capacity of local government, “LGGCs should use a combination of indicators in their 
assessment methodology” (MCS 1996: 45). Furthermore “revenue calculation should not be 
seen as a calculation of the capacity to raise rates, but as a broader calculation of capacity to 
raise revenue by whatever means a councils chooses” (MCS 1996: 39). This was supported by 
an earlier CGC report entitled Report on the Interstate Distribution of General Purpose 
Grants for Local Government (1991), which advocated the assessment of revenue raising 
capacity on the basis of land value for commercial and industrial land, household income for 
residential land, and farm income for rural land. On the other hand, it has been argued that 
LGGCs using aggregate property values will maintain consistency with state practices and the 
fact that property rates are the dominant source of local government revenue. Both sides of 
the debate recognise the data issues involved in making consistent comparisons between local 
government areas on any basis other than property values (NOLG 1997: 101). However, the 
National Office of Local Government (1997: 101) has recently concluded that: 
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[A]nyone comparing the different methods of assessing rating capacity used by 
Commissions would find it difficult to escape the conclusion that they are too 
various for all to be consistent with equalisation.  
Roads grants 
The Commonwealth contributes to the funding of road construction and maintenance through 
both the local roads and the general purpose components of grants. However, neither part of 
the grant is tied, and councils generally spend significantly more on roads than the local roads 
component of the grant received (NOLG 1997). 
In NSW some 25 percent of the local roads component is distributed to councils in the 
Sydney, Newcastle, Wollongong areas, with the remainder of the state receiving the balance. 
For the general purpose component, the NSW LGGC distinguishes between urban local, 
sealed rural, and unsealed rural local roads. Disability factors for topography, climate, soils, 
materials, drainage, traffic density and travel are taken into account. Additional expenditure 
needs are factored in for culverts and bridges. In Victoria the local roads and general purpose 
component are distributed according to a ‘Mulholland asset preservation model’. This method 
distinguishes between road surfaces, and combines ratings for soil, traffic, climate, drainage, 
materials and terrain to assess relevant needs. Tasmania also allocates 66.5 percent of the 
local roads component on this basis. For the remainder, 28.5 percent is distributed in 
proportion to bridge deck areas (excluding culverts), and 5 percent allocated to councils with 
an above average ratio of unsealed roads to sealed roads.  
In Queensland, 63 percent of the local roads component is distributed on the basis of road 
length, 37 percent on the basis of population, and grants are limited to a maximum annual 
reduction of 5 percent for any single council. For the general purpose component, roads are 
distinguished by surface type (sealed, gravelled, formed and unformed) and relative 
disabilities calculated in reference to traffic volume, topography and road type. For Western 
Australia, 93 percent of the local roads component and all of the general purpose component 
are distributed on the basis of an ‘asset preservation model’. This model takes into account 
annual and recurrent maintenance costs and the costs of end-of-life reconstruction. On the 
other hand, South Australia distinguishes between metropolitan and non-metropolitan roads 
for the local roads component. The general purpose component is distributed in an identical 
manner, except that roads are divided into six categories. Finally, in the Northern Territory 
local roads are maintained through a roads trust. Funds are distributed on ‘needs’ criteria from 
this trust on the basis of road lengths weighted by type. 
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Differences in the allocation of road grants across states arise for four main reasons (NOLG 
1997). Firstly, some states distribute some part of their grants solely on the basis of road 
length and population, like South Australia and NSW. Other states, such as Western 
Australia, have constructed sophisticated asset preservation models that take into account 
maintenance and eventual replacement. Secondly, most other states factor additional disability 
factors into assessing expenditure needs. These needs may relate to climate, topography, 
traffic volume, and so on. Thirdly, a number of states, including Tasmania and NSW, make 
allowances for the type of road in the allocation. Finally, several states use different methods 
to allocate the local roads component in the general purpose component, although others do 
not.  
General purpose grants 
Although roads are the biggest category of expenditure for many councils, the LGGC in each 
state assesses between five and thirty classes of expenditure. For each class of expenditure, 
the LGGCs estimate how much each council, in the circumstances in which it is placed, 
would have to spend to provide services of average standard. Estimates are guided by the 
objective assessment of expenditure ‘disabilities’ (or disability factors) in each class of 
expenditure, corresponding to postulated systemic influences on expenditure which are 
beyond a council’s control. Consistent with the notion of effort neutrality, the LGGCs do not 
compensate for cost differences which arise due to policy decisions of the council, 
management performance, or accounting differences. For example, in Table 6 the disability 
factors for general administration expenditures in each state are detailed. Factors usually taken 
account of in assessing disabilities include the proportion of the population from low 
socioeconomic backgrounds, population growth and decline, and scale allowances. However, 
there is not a great deal of consistency across the various state LGGCs in the use of these 
factors. 
The different disabilities are added to estimate the overall cost disability in percentage terms. 
This multiplied by state average expenditure per capita provides a measure of ‘standardised 
expenditure’: that is, how much each council would have to spend to provide the average 
level of service. The disabilities thus obtained may either be positive (a cost disadvantage) 
implying a greater than average per capita cost of service provision, or negative (a cost 
advantage) implying a lesser than average per capita cost of service provisions. Typically, 
negative disabilities are not calculated, so that the minimum weighting for the disability is 
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zero. Grants are then applied in proportion to assessed disability factors and standard per 
capita grants for each category of expenditure. 
Table 6: General Administration Disability Factors, 1997 
Themes NSW Vic. Qld. SA WA Tas. NT 
Scale allowance Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Population growth or decline Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Persons of non-English speaking background Yes No No Yes No No No 
Duplication of facilities, scatter of settlement Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Isolation Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Proportion of non-residents No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Proportion of Aboriginals Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Proportion of young people, aged No No No No No No No 
Climatic influences No No No No No No No 
Source: National Office of Local Government, 1996-97 Report on the Operation of the Local Government 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1995. 
Across the various states, a great deal of variation exists in the functions (or areas of 
expenditure) assessed, the types of disability factors taken into account, and the weighting 
applied to each factor in overall disability calculation. For example, 21 local government 
functions are assessed in NSW, 20 in Victoria, 18 in South Australia, 11 in Tasmania and 
only 9 in Western Australia.  
Efficiency and grant distribution 
To date, the Commonwealth has not required the LGGCs to pay explicit attention in grant 
allocation to the efficiency with which local councils operate. The reasons for this are 
threefold. First, under the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act horizontal 
equalisation has been the major policy goal. Second, the phrase ‘by reasonable effort’ in the 
legislation has largely been interpreted to refer solely to the rating effort of councils, and does 
not take into account any matters concerning reasonable efforts to ensure economic 
efficiency. Finally, the assumption of ‘effort neutrality’ which relates to policy decisions by 
councils, has been interpreted to mean that councils should not be able to act in a manner 
which affects their grant (AURDR 1994a: 13). Accordingly, grants to councils only reflect 
factors beyond their control, and therefore the LGGC grants process neither rewards nor 
penalises councils with differing levels of efficiency. 
However, it has been argued that LGGC methodologies have influenced the efficiency of 
local councils, irrespective of their lack of legislative mandate (AURDR 1994a). Both 
positive and negative factors have been identified. On one hand, it has been argued that “by 
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providing the highest per capita support to those councils with revenue raising difficulties and 
expenditure needs in regard to size, sparcity, location and cost disabilities, [the grants system] 
may not be conducive to an efficient allocation if resources” (AURDR 1994a: 55). 
Alternatively, it has been observed that “councils which are cost effective may be rewarded 
through unit cost adjustments up to the standard if their operations are cost effective” 
(AURDR 1994a: 14).  
However, the Grants Commission’s (1994: 16) argument that “the use of council’s 
expenditure in the calculations [expenditure disabilities] is limited to determining a state 
standard cost for each selected function” ignores the impact of several inefficient or efficient 
councils on grant outcomes. For example, suppose that councils’ expenditure in a particular 
function is broadly efficient. In the case of industry wide efficiency this would infer a lower 
standard cost for that function, irrespective of factors beyond managerial control, thereby 
putting strong pressure on councils to improve efficiency to the state standard. Alternatively, 
if the industry standard is broadly inefficient, thereby implying a higher standard expenditure 
cost, the incentive for councils to improve their inefficiency is removed. At the very least, 
these factors may serve to institutionalise a given level of efficiency in a given function over 
time. Moreover, the fact that councils can internally subsidise inefficient functions, combined 
with the impact of the minimum per capita grant, suggests that any purported financial 
penalties may be limited. 
Table 7: Extent to which councils have been encouraged to be more efficient due to LGGC method and formulae  
 NSW Vic. Qld. SA WA Tas. Total 
Large 8.8 25.8 13.5 12.7 26.8 20.0 17.3 
Small 51.5 28.8 28.8 52.7 42.9 40.0 41.3 
Not at all 33.8 43.9 50.0 32.7 30.4 40.0 37.8 
Unsure 5.9 1.5 7.7 1.8 0.0 0.0 3.5 
Source: Australian Urban and Regional Development Review (1994) National Survey of 
Councils. 
On balance, evidence from the 1993 National Survey of Councils suggests that the grants 
process used in Australia does influence efficiency, in spite of being overtly effort neutral 
(AURDR 1994a). As shown in Table 7, 17.3 percent of all surveyed councils indicated that 
LGGC methodologies had encouraged them to be more efficient to a large extent, 41.3 
percent to a small extent, and 37.8 percent not at all. Just 12 percent thought that efficiency 
was not a criteria used by the LGGC in determining grants.  
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Concluding remarks 
In common with all federal systems of government, the Australian fiscal federalism is 
characterised by fiscal imbalance. Firstly, vertical fiscal imbalances arise because different 
levels of government have differing capacities to raise revenues to finance expenditure. As we 
have seen, the power of Australian local government to raise revenue is extremely attenuated. 
And secondly, horizontal fiscal imbalances occur since different levels of government, 
including local government, experience divergent costs in the provision of public goods and 
do not have equivalent revenue-raising capacities. Whilst most federal countries have pursued 
formal or informal tax-sharing arrangements between different levels of government, 
Australia has established a policy of horizontal fiscal equalisation and effort (or policy) 
neutrality, with the Commonwealth distributing grants to both local and state government. 
Indeed, it has been cogently argued that "Australia has developed the most comprehensive, 
effective and equitable system of fiscal equalisation in the world" (Matthews 1994: 16).  
However, despite the fact that the Commonwealth government provides the funding, the 
actual allocation and distribution of monies to local governments is made through state-based 
LGGCs. The principles applied by these LGGCs to grant allocation are largely based upon a 
common legislative core: (i) allocation of funds on a full horizontal equalisation basis; (ii) the 
functioning of each local government at a standard not lower than the average standard of 
other local governing bodies in the state; (iii) the assessment of revenue and expenditure 
needs and disabilities; and (iv) effort neutrality. The most important consideration here is that 
the allocation of grants is based on the LGGCs objective assessment of local government 
needs and disabilities and is technically independent of policy-related council decisions, 
including those relating to efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is some anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that LGGC methodologies do influence council efficiency, and thereby 
compromise the primacy of the horizontal equalisation objective.  
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